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Abstract 
We use a panel dataset of UK workers to look for evidence of compensating wage 
differentials for workplace risk, combined with risk data at the four-digit industry level.  
We discuss various econometric problems associated with the hedonic wage approach, 
namely the instability of the estimates to specification changes, unobserved 
heterogeneity, and endogeneity. We find evidence of significant compensating wage 
differentials and VSL figures only under the most restrictive assumptions, i.e. when we 
assume that there is no unobserved heterogeneity and that all regressors are exogenous. 
However, the VSL values are large and vary dramatically with the inclusion or exclusion 
of industry and/or occupation dummies, as well as with the addition of nonfatal risk.  
When we specify models that allow for heterogeneity and endogeneity of risk and of 
other regressors, we find no evidence of compensating wage differentials.  We conclude 
that if compensating differentials for risk exist, econometric problems and the changing 
nature of labor markets prevent us from observing them. We also conclude that models 
and techniques for panel data that account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity 
present a completely different picture about compensating wage differentials than that 
inferred by most wage-risk studies, which have generally used single cross sections of 
data.   
 
Keywords: Value of life, labor market, wage hedonics 
JEL classification: J17, J28, J31 
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Estimating the Value of Safety with Labor Market Data: 
Are the Results Trustworthy? 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, a large body of research has documented the existence 
of substantial inter-industry wage differentials in the US (since Krueger and Summers, 
1988) and several other countries (e.g., Palme and Wright, 1992; Lucifora, 1993; 
Vainiomäki and Laaksonen, 1995; Erdil and Yetkiner, 2001; Sakellariou, 2004; Hsu, 
2005)). Alternative explanations for this phenomenon include the existence of efficiency 
wages, unobserved worker ability (Keane, 1993; Goux and Maurin, 1999; Bhalotra, 
2006), and industry-specific skills (Neal, 1995; Weinberg, 2001; Tang and Tseng, 2004). 
Over roughly the same period, considerable attention has also been dedicated to 
estimating worker risk premiums. Viscusi (1993) surveys 24 hedonic wage studies 
conducted in the US between 1974 and 1991 that found a positive association between 
workplace fatal injury risks and wages, once other worker and job characteristics were 
controlled for, and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report on ov r 60 studies conducted in the 
US and all over the world over about thirty years.  
The rationale of compensating wage studies is that workers must be offered 
higher wages for them to accept jobs with a greater risk of dying on the job, ceteris 
paribus, and that employers are willing to do so to the extent that it is cheaper than 
installing safety equipment in the workplace. The demands of workers and the offerings 
of firms will meet at the tangency points between the workers’ indifference curves and 
the firms’ isoprofit curves in the risk-wage space. The hedonic wage relationship is the 
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locus of these tangency points, and the slope of this locus is the willingness to pay for a 
marginal decrease in risk (or the willingness to accept for a marginal increase in risk).   
The tradeoff between pay and risk implicit in a worker’s occupational choice is 
summarized into the so-called Value of a Statistical Life. This is defined as the rate at 
which individuals are prepared to trade off income for reductions in the risk of death, and 
can be equivalently described as the total WTP by a group of N individuals experiencing 
a uniform reduction of 1/N in their risk of dying. Based on their survey of the US 
literature, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) recommend VSL figures of $5-9 million (2000 US 
dollars). Estimates of the VSL based on compensating wage studies are available for 
several European countries, including the UK, where they usually range between $4 and 
$11 million,1 and Switzerland (6.5-9.5 million 2000 dollars; Baranzini and Ferro Luzzi, 
2001).2 
The concept of VSL is deemed as the appropriate construct for ex ante analyses of 
safety regulations and policies, when the identities of the people whose lives are saved by 
the policy are not known. The notion of VSL is reasonably well accepted in academic and 
policy circles, and the estimates of the VSL implicit in workers’ occupational choices are 
considered credible enough for the US Environmental Protection Agency to rely on them 
to estimate the (avoided) mortality benefits delivered by environmental policies that save 
lives. In its 2000 Guidelines for Economic Analyses, the EPA relied on 21 compensating 
                                                 
1 In some cases, studies based on UK data have found the VSL to be much larger than the upper bound of 
this range. For example, Siebert and Wei (1994), Sandy and Elliott (1996), Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) 
and Sandy (2001) peg the VSL in the range between €4.3 million and €74.4 million (equal to $4.0 million 
to $68.5 million at the 2000 exchange rate). A meta-analysis by CSERGE (1999) generates a range of VSL 
figures between €2.9 million and €100 million, resulting in weighted average equal to €6.5 million (all 
2000 €, the corresponding dollar amounts being $2.7, $92.1 and $6.0 million). 
2 Using the 1995 Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) and the 1994 Swiss Wage Structure Survey (SWSS), 
Baranzini and Ferro Luzzi peg the VSL implicit in the choices of Swiss workers in the range of CHF 10 to 
CHF 15 million (Swiss Francs, equivalent to $6.5 to $9.5 million 2000 US dollars). They find that the VSL 
depends on risk level, union coverage, and age.   
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wage studies, out of a total of 26 studies, to produce a VSL figure ($6.1 million 2000 
dollars). This figure was thus based on evidence from labor markets, but was used in 
subsequent environmental policy analyses.3 
Recent research, however, has questioned the credibility of many estimates of the 
VSL from labor markets. Leigh (1995), Arabsheibani and Marin (2000, 2001), Black and 
Kniesner (2003), and Black et al. (2003) suggest that the estimates of the VSL from 
compensating wage studies are econometrically very fragile, for reasons that include 
poorly measured workplace risk, collinearity of risk estimates with industry dummies 
used to account for inter-industry wage differentials, endogeneity (an individual’s level of 
risk may be determined simultaneously with his job, and hence with the wage), omitted 
regressors, and heterogeneous preferences for risk and income.  
We study the severity of these problems and their effects on the VSL using a 
panel dataset of UK workers. To our knowledge, this is the first time panel data are used 
to study the robustness (or lack thereof) of VSL estimates in the UK labor market 
context.4 The panel nature of our data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
even when the unobserved individual-specific effects are correlated with included 
regressors (as in the “within” estimator, which is well suited to fixed effects model), and 
to apply alternate instrumental-variable techniques (e.g., Hausman and Taylor, 1981) to 
address endogeneity of risk with wages.   
                                                 
3 Clearly, doing so assumes that individuals would apply the same marginal rate of substitution between 
income and risk in both the original and the new policy context. This reliance on labor market estimates of 
the VSL—which occurs when original estimates of the willingness to pay to reduce the risk of dying in a 
specified environment context are not available—is not uncontroversial. The use of VSL figures from 
compensating wage studies when computing the mortality benefits of environmental policies has been 
criticized on the grounds of the fact that it mirrors the preferences of healthy males whose average age is 
40, rather than those of the primary beneficiaries of environmental policies—the elderly and those in 
compromised health. Adjustments to the VSL for remaining life years were subsequently proposed, and 
eventually repealed. 
4 See Kniesner et al. (2006) for use of longitudinal data for US workers.  
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We find that only under the most restrictive assumptions (i.e., when unobserved 
heterogeneity is ruled out and workplace risks is treated as exogenous, as in a classical 
regression model estimated by OLS) is there evidence of compensating wages and is the 
VSL statistically significant. These OLS-based VSL values are, however, sensitive to the 
inclusion in the model of non-fatal injury risks and variables such as industry and 
occupation dummies, which may be correlated with risks; they are also suspiciously large 
and well above the range of values usually considered acceptable (Viscusi and Aldy, 
2003). Our preferred estimation approaches—which allow for unobserved heterogeneity, 
endogenous risks and other endogenous regressors, and exploit our longitudinal data—
find no evidence of compensating wage differentials. These results raise serious doubts 
about the credibility of VSL figures based on labor market studies—which are generally 
based on cross-sections of data—and underscore the importance of interpreting and using 
existing VSL estimates with caution in policy analyses.   
Despite these results, we note here that the notion of VSL is the theoretically 
correct metric to use when estimating the mortality benefits of environmental and safety 
policies, and that there are many other approaches for obtaining the VSL.  For example, 
the value that people place on risk reductions can be inferred from purchases of safety 
devices (e.g., smoke detectors), from the extra price people pay for products that are safer 
than others (e.g., automobiles with side airbags; homes in less polluted areas, Portney, 
1981), or from the time spent on risk-reducing behaviors (such as fastening seat belts 
when driving, etc; Blomquist, 2004, Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004).  Contingent 
valuation and other stated-preference surveys are another widely used option to elicit 
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people’s willingness to trade off income for risk reduction (Jones-Lee et al. 1985, 
Johannesson et al. 1997, Alberini et al. 2004, Tsuge et al. 2005).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the 
concept of VSL and illustrate how it is usually estimated using labor market data. In 
section III, we discuss the main econometric limitations of the conventional approach. 
Section IV illustrates these limitations and explores possible remedies using UK worker 
data. Section V concludes.   
 
II. VSL Estimates from Compensating Wage Studies 
The VSL is the marginal rate at which individuals are prepared to trade off 
income for risk reductions:  
(1)  
R∂
WTPVSL ∂=    
where R is the risk of dying and WTP is the Willingness to Pay for a reduction in risk, 
i.e., the maximum amount that can be subtracted from an individual’s income to keep his 
or her expected utility unchanged for specified levels of risk. It has been empirically 
estimated by looking at the time individuals spend engaging in risk-reducing activities 
(such as fastening seatbelts, Blomquist, 1979), at how much they pay for additional safety 
features in their vehicles (Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1990; Andersson, 2005) or for safer 
bicycle helmets (Jenkins et al., 2001), and by directly asking people to report their WTP 
for a specified hypothetical risk reduction. The bulk of the literature on the VSL, 
however, comes from compensating wage studies (Viscusi, 1993; Miller, 2000; Viscusi 
and Aldy, 2003). 
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Figure 1 shows the hedonic wage curve, which is the locus of tangency between 
workers’ indifference curves (EU) and the firms’ isoprofit curves (OC) in the risk wage 
space. In a typical compensating wage study, data are gathered on the wage rate, 
education, experience, occupation, and other individual characteristics of workers and 
workplace characteristics. These data are then used to run a regression relating the wage 
rate to the risk of fatal and non-fatal injuries, while controlling for the education and 
experience of the worker, and other job and worker characteristics thought to influence 
wages. A frequently used specification of the wage regression is: 
(2)   wi = β0 + x iβ1 + piβ2 + qiβ3 + εi
where wi is the wage rate for worker i and, x is a vector of individual, workplace and 
occupational characteristics, such as experience, education, age, gender, marital status, 
union status of the worker, industry dummies, occupation dummies, and location 
dummies.5 The variable p measures the risk of dying on the job, while q is the risk of 
non-fatal injuries. The βs are the coefficients to be estimated, and the VSL can be 
inferred from β2. For example, if w measures annual earnings and p annual fatal 
workplace risk in X per 100,000, then the VSL is calculated as )000,100( 2β× .   
Viscusi (1993) argues that q must be included in the compensating wage equation. 
Since p and q are generally highly correlated, failure to do so would result in biased 
estimates of the β2 coefficient, and hence of the VSL. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) examine 
some 60 wage-risk studies conducted all over the world, finding that many of them, 
                                                 
5 In empirical work, the logarithmic transformation of the wage rate often replaces w as the dependent 
variable in the regression. The wage rate, w, and fatality risk, p, are usually measured on an annual basis. 
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however, do not control for non-fatal risk.6  Miller (2000) notes that nonfatal injury risks 
are highly correlated with fatality risks and that the common practice of including only 
the former in the hedonic regression to reduce collinearity means that the compensating 
wage differentials estimated in this fashion are absorbing both VSL and injury risk 
compensation.  Omission of either risk variable is likely to inflate the coefficient on the 
other risk term (Meng and Smith, 1999).   
 
Figure 1: Hedonic wage curve 
 
Source: Viscusi and Aldy (2003). 
 
Estimates of the compensating wage differentials (the ex ante compensation for 
risk) should also be influenced by workers’ wage replacement rates in the event of an 
accident (i.e., workers’ compensation, which is an ex post compensation) (Moore and 
Viscusi, 1990a). Meng and Smith (1999) show that the workers’ compensation system 
                                                 
6 In addition, Viscusi (1993) recommends that equation (3) should include expected worker compensation 
in the event of a non-fatal workplace accident, i.e., (WC×q), where WC is the level of workers 
compensation paid out to the worker if he experience an accident at work.  
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reduces risk premium estimates for Ontario workers and conclude that the effects of 
insurance schemes on pay are substantial.  
People’s job choices should be influenced by perceived risks, not by actual risk 
levels, but the majority of wage-risk studies has constructed “objective” measures of 
workplace risks and assigned those measures to individual workers. Until recently 
workplace fatality and hazard rates were usually available only at the worker’s industry 
or occupation level, but not for industry-occupation pairs (Viscusi, 2003), thus resulting 
in mismeasured risks. Attention has been usually restricted to male workers and to blue 
collar professions in an effort to limit measurement errors in the risk variable.  It has also 
been argued—and empirical evidence has been found in support of these notions—that 
compensating wage differentials should be different for older workers because of their 
shorter life expectancies (Viscusi and Aldy, 2007), that smokers select into riskier jobs 
and receive less compensation for such risks (Viscusi and Hersch, 2001) and that 
compensating wage differentials for risk may vary with race, reflecting different tastes 
for risk and income that are not correlated with wealth, different life expectancies, and 
different market opportunities (Viscusi, 2003).  
Finally, union status may influence compensating wage differentials for risks, 
because unions may be better informed about workplace fatality and injury risks and have 
more bargaining power than individual workers. Mrozek and Taylor (2002) conduct a 
meta-analysis of the wage-risk studies, and report that those studies where the sample 
consisted exclusively of union workers have indeed found systematically higher VSLs 
than the others. In contrast to the US, where most hedonic wage studies report higher 
VSL for union workers, empirical studies of the UK labor market published in the 1980s 
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and early 1990s detect lower compensating wage differentials for union workers than for 
non-union workers.7  Siebert and Wei (1994) attribute this result to the failure to control 
for endogeneity of risks and union status, both of which are likely to be correlated with 
unobserved ability. They argue that workers with greater ability demand greater 
compensation for risk. Since these workers receive higher earnings and choose lower risk 
jobs, OLS estimates of compensating wage differentials will be downward-biased. At the 
same time, firms are under pressure to recognize and reward ability so as to offset higher 
union pay, with the result that union workers have more unmeasured ability than non-
union workers.  To account for these factors, they estimate switching wage regressions 
for union and non-union workers, where union membership is endogenous. Risk—which 
enters in the right-hand side of the two status equations—is also treated as endogenous 
and instrumented for. Siebert and Wei do find support for their hypothesis that union 
workers have lower workplace risks and higher VSLs. 
 
III. Exploring and Addressing Limitations of Compensating Wage 
Studies 
Based on Leigh (1995), Black et al. (2003), and Black and Kniesner (2003), one 
suspects that compensating wage studies are rife with econometric problems. In this 
section, we discuss three main problems: (1) lack of robustness with respect to 
specification changes, (2) endogeneity of risk, (3) unobserved heterogeneity among 
workers, and/or (4) unobserved heterogeneity specifically in the workers’ preferences for 
risk and income.  
                                                 
7 Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) question the existence of wage-risk compensation for non-union workers in 
the US. 
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A. Instability of Risk Coefficients 
Evidence from recent studies points to the fact that the estimates of the VSL are 
not robust to even minor changes in the specification of equation (2), i.e., in the choice of 
the right-hand side variables. For example, in much empirical work industry dummies are 
entered in the right-hand side of (2) to capture inter-industry wage differentials, which 
have been widely documented to exist since Krueger and Summers (1988). Leigh (1995) 
finds that when industry dummies are included in the regression, the coefficient on risk is 
no longer significant. He interprets this to imply that inter-industry wage differentials, not 
compensating wages for risks of dying on the job, explain the positive correlations 
usually found between wages and mortality risks. He argues that workplace risks tend to 
be highly correlated with, and end up capturing, unpleasant aspects of jobs in certain 
industries. Another interpretation is, of course, that even broad industry dummies are 
strongly correlated with workplace mortality risks, and that such collinearity makes it 
impossible to disentangle the effects of risks from those of one’s industry.  
In a recent study commissioned by the US Environmental Protection Agency, 
Black et al. (2003) explore the issue of stability of the estimates of the price of workplace 
risk, using three sources of data about individual workers and two sources of risk data. 
They show that (i) the estimates of the coefficient on risk vary dramatically with small 
changes in the inclusion of covariates in the right-hand side of the regression model; (ii) 
many of these coefficient estimates are negative, instead of positive; and (iii) using 
flexible functional forms confirms these OLS results.  
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B. Endogeneity and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
There is reason to believe that job risk is endogenous with the wage rate, the 
dependent variable in the regression equation. This is because wage rates and one’s job 
choice (and hence workplace risks) are both likely to be affected by the same individual 
characteristics (e.g., skills), and these characteristics are usually not well captured using 
the variables available in most datasets. This results in correlation between risk and the 
error term in equation (2): 0)( ≠iipE ε  and 0)( ≠iiqE ε .  
Using a very rich dataset (the National Longitudinal Study, which reports Armed 
Forces Qualification Test scores), Black et al. find evidence that job risk is indeed 
correlated with individual characteristics and behaviors not usually available in most 
commonly used datasets, confirming the above argument and implying that the OLS 
estimates of the coefficient on risk is biased. Measurement error and self-selection are 
likely reasons why an effort to estimate a compensating wage model for Italian workers 
by Barone and Nese (2002) failed to detect a significant relationship between wage rates 
and objectively measured job risk. 
Yet, few empirical studies attempt to correct for endogeneity of wage and risk. 
Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) begin with treating risk as endogenous, which means that 
they must instrument for it, and at the same time allow for heterogeneous preferences for 
risk and income by treating the coefficient on risk as a random variable. However, 
because of severe collinearity problems, they are not able to compute reliable VSL 
estimates when correcting for risk endogeneity and end up reporting only results based on 
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treating risk as exogenous.8  In a later study, Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) suggest that 
poor instruments are the main cause of these collinearity problems.9  
This implies that it should be possible to circumvent this problem by finding good 
instruments and/or by applying techniques based on panel data that construct instruments 
through transformations of whatever exogenous variables are available (such as the 
Hausman and Taylor approach, 1981), as we do below. 
Using a panel dataset it is also possible to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
among workers, which occurs when two individuals with identical observed 
characteristics have systematically different wage rates. Standard approaches include 
fixed-effects models, which are estimated by the “within” estimator, and random-effects 
models, which are estimated by GLS. The latter rely on the assumption that the 
unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the regressors included in the model, while the 
former are robust to this possibility, but are less efficient (Hsiao, 2003).  
 
C. Possible Estimation Approaches 
As described in more detail in the next section, we use a panel dataset that follows 
workers in the UK to study the issues described in III.A and III.B. Our plan is comprised 
of five main tasks. The first is to instrument for workplace risks. The second is to 
estimate fixed effects and random effects models without instrumenting for risk. Large 
differences in the estimated coefficients across the coefficients from the fixed and 
                                                 
8 When treating workplace mortality as exogenous, they find evidence of the existence of compensating 
wage differentials consistent with an average VSL to be around £9.7 million, with lower values for manual 
workers and larger values for managerial/professional workers. 
9 Wei (1999) instruments for risk and assumes that the north and south of England are separate labor 
markets to identify the VSL using a structural approach similar to that previously used in Biddle and Zarkin 
(1988).  
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random effects models—to be formally assessed using the Hausman test—would be 
interpreted as evidence of correlation between the individual-specific effects and the 
regressors included in the model.  
Next, we allow for risk to be endogenous in a fixed-effects model, which we 
estimate by first-differencing the data and using past risk as the identifying instrument for 
the first-difference in risk. Formally, if the original model is 
(3)  itiititit cpy εαβ +++= x , 
with  potentially correlated with the error term, first-differencing swipes out the fixed 
effects , resulting in  
itp
ic
(4)  itititit py εαβ Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ x . 
If the new error term itεΔ  is stationary, this model can be estimated by pooled 
2SLS (see Wooldridge, 2002, page 308-309), where  (assumed to be strictly 
exogenous) and  serve as instruments for 
itx
2−itp itpΔ . Another advantage of this approach 
is that if workplace risk is measured with error, and if the  in (3) is an m-year moving 
average of the raw annual risk rates (in our application below and in Viscusi, 2004, m=3), 
taking the first difference should reduce the measurement error that remains in 
itp
itpΔ  
(Kniesner et al., 2006).10 As always with instrumental-variable estimation, it is important 
to test for overidentifying restrictions to make sure that the selected instruments are 
                                                 
10 The labor economics literature has devoted considerable attention to the issue of mismeasured wages 
(see, for example, Griliches and Hausman, 1984; Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bound et al., 2001, and Kim 
and Solon, 2005) and the possible correlation between the measurement error and wages, deriving under 
which conditions the biases of the coefficients are exacerbated or mitigated by the use of panel data and 
first-differences. We do not have social security earnings against which to compare the reported wages, so 
in this paper we are forced to ignore this issue and to take wages at face value. We are also forced to ignore 
the issue that risks might be mismeasured, with similar consequences, but first-differencing should reduce 
the seriousness of the risk mismeasurement.  
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appropriate, i.e., that they are correlated with the endogenous variable  and 
uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation, 
itpΔ
itεΔ .   
Our fourth task is to replace the fixed effect c  in model (3) with a random effect, 
and estimate the random-effects model thus obtained using the Hausman-Taylor 
approach, which allows risk as well as other variables to be endogenous.  The Hausman-
Taylor approach focuses on the regression equation: 
i
(5)  [ ]iiiii v ηιαβ +++= ZXy ,  
where yi is a T×1 vector of observations on the dependent variable for individual i, Xi is a 
T×k matrix of time-varying regressors and Zi is a T×G matrix of time-invariant 
regressors. In the term in brackets,  is the individual-specific component of the error 
term, 
iv
ι  is a T×1 vector of ones, and iη  is a T×1 vector of independent error terms.  After 
stacking individual vectors and matrices of variables, equation (5) becomes 
(6)  [ ]ςαβ +++= VWZXy ,  
where y, X, Z and ς  have nT rows, V is an nT×1 matrix of individual dummies, and W is 
an n×1 vector of idiosyncratic error terms. Further let Ω denote the variance covariance 
matrix of the error terms in brackets. 
The Hausman-Taylor approach first distinguishes between exogenous and 
endogenous (i.e., correlated with W) time-varying and time-invariant regressors, namely 
 and , where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the 
exogenous and endogenous subsets, respectively. It then implements an instrumental-
estimation approach corrected for the non-spherical nature of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the error terms in the brackets in equation (6): 
[ ]21 XXX M= [ 21 ZZZ M= ]
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(7) 
ˆ β 
ˆ α 
⎡ 
⎣ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ ⎥ = W'Ω
−1/ 2PAΩ−1/ 2W[ ]−1 ′ W Ω−1/ 2PAΩ−1/ 2y ,  
where , and A is a matrix of instruments. Hausman and Taylor propose 
using (i) the deviations from the individual’s means of the X1, (ii) the deviations from the 
means of Z1, and (iii) X1 and Z1 as instruments. 
AA)AA(P 1A ′′= −
Finally, an alternative type of heterogeneity is the one studied in Arabsheibani 
and Marin (2000, 2001), who treat risk as endogenous and preferences for risk and 
income as heterogene us by allowing the coefficient on risk to be random.11  Formally, 
fatal and non-fatal risks are expressed as 
(8) pi = γ0 + ziγ1 + ε2i 
(9) qi = δ0 + ziδ1 + ε3i. 
In equations (8) and (9), vector zi includes all covariates contained in xi plus, as 
per the definition of instrument, additional variables that determine risk choice but are not 
correlated with the error term in the wage equation.  In practice, we choose the same 
instruments as in our regular 2SLS procedure.   
Coefficients 2β  and 3β  in equation (2) are replaced with ii u122 += ββ  and 
ii u233 += ββ , respectively. After substituting these into the wage equation, one obtains: 
(10)  iiiiiiiii uqquppw 1231210ln εββββ ++++++= x . 
Garen (1984, 1988) proposed a consistent two-step estimation procedure for this 
model. In the first step, one runs OLS on equations (8) and (9) and forms the residuals 
i2εˆ  and i3εˆ . In the second step, one runs OLS on the equation: 
                                                 
11 This type of heterogeneity is thus conceptually distinct from the heterogeneity usually represented by 
individual-specific fixed or random effects. 
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(11)  iiiiiii pcccpw 233221210 ˆˆˆln εεεβββ +++++= x  
.ˆˆˆ 363524 iiiiiii eqcpcqc ++++ εεε  
For all models and estimation techniques, we fit four specifications to make sure that we 
examine the effect of adding industry and occupation controls, and non-fatal workplace 
risks, on the compensating wage differentials.  
 
IV. Application  
A. Data 
We illustrate the problems discussed in the preceding sections and study their 
effects on the estimates of the VSL using data on worker characteristics from the British 
Household Panel Survey (BPHS).  These data are collected through annual surveys, 
called waves, from 1991 through 2003. Each wave roughly corresponds to a different 
calendar year. Among other things, the dataset contains information about the workers’ 
occupation, hours worked, earnings, experience, tenure with the present employer, 
education, and family status.  
For waves 11, 12, and 13 of the BHPS, which correspond to 2001, 2002, and 
2003, we were able to match the BHPS data with three-year moving averages of the 
workplace fatality rates for the worker’s industry at the four digit-SIC code from the 
UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE).12 Using three-year moving averages in lieu of 
the raw mortality rates is common in compensating wage studies (Viscusi, 2004) to 
smooth out any unusual fluctuations in fatalities and to reduce the prevalence of industry 
                                                 
12 Specifically, we average the risk of the current year with that those of the two previous years. 
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or occupation cells where the mortality rate is zero in a given year.  We express fatality 
rates as X per 100,000 a year.  
As in earlier studies, attention is restricted to full-time male workers aged 20-65 
living in England and Wales.  Because of the very distinct risk-related circumstances of 
their work environment, we excluded farmers, agricultural workers, firefighters, police 
officers, persons in the Armed Forces and security personnel from our sample.13  We also 
created a subset of workers in blue-collar professions.14  The total number of workers in 
our full sample is 2458, for a total of 4940 observations.15  The sample of blue-collar 
workers is comprised of 1267 persons and 2352 observations. The panel is unbalanced, 
with roughly equal numbers of workers being followed for one, two, or all three years.  
Descriptive statistics of the samples are displayed in table 1. Summary 
information about occupational risks is reported in table 2. As shown in table 2, the 
average risks are 1.24 in 100,000 a year for all workers and 1.79 in 100,000 a year for 
blue-collar workers.  There is also more variability in the risks of blue collar works, 
which suggests that this subsample might lend itself better to a compensating wage 
differential study (Moore and Viscusi, 1990b). 
                                                 
13 SIC 92 categories A, B, P and Q and SOC 90 codes 600-619, 900-903.   
14 We define as blue-collar jobs SOC 80 codes 500-599 (craft and related occupations), 620-699 (personal 
occupations), 719-722 (sales assistants & check-out operators plus other sales representatives, 733 (scrap 
dealers and scrap metal merchants), 800-899 (plant & machine operatives), and 910-990 (other occupations 
except for agriculture, forestry & fishing).  
15 For the 2001-03 period, the BHPS contains 26,703 observations. We lose about half of this sample once 
we exclude women, 979 observations when we restrict attention to persons aged 18-65, and 734 when we 
rule out persons in high-risk professions. Of the 11,921 remaining observations, for 285 we were unable to 
match risk data. For 1,139 we did not have income information; 600 are excluded because these workers 
report being employed full time, but wages are less than £4,000 a year, and 539 are excluded because the 
workers do not work full time. This leaves us with 9,358 observations, from which we drop persons that 
live in Wales or Northern Ireland (losing 2,878 observations) and observations for which three-year 
average risk rates could not be computed (49 observations). This leaves us with a sample of 6,431 
observations, but the usable sample is 4,940 because of missing values for a number of covariates.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Waves 11-13   Full sample (n=4940) Blue collar workers (n=2352) 
Variable Description Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max 
          
incdef Annual income in 1996 pounds 20,628 12,016 3,781 221,873 16,616 6,947 3,781 142,612 
educ Education in years 10.257 1.089 6 15 9.850 0.810 6 14 
experience Work experience in years 24.3 11.0 3 52 24.1 11.4 3 52 
expsq Experience squared 712.5 574.6 9 2704 711.9 593.7 9 2704 
jbot Overtime hours in normal week 5.296 7.015 0 80 5.557 7.216 0 80 
tenure Years at current job 5.360 6.532 0 46 6.108 7.062 0 46 
healthy (1/0) 1=healthy (self-reported) 0.923 0.266 0 1 0.921 0.270 0 1 
white (1/0) 1=white 0.266 0.442 0 1 0.259 0.438 0 1 
union (1/0) 1=member of union 0.312 0.463 0 1 0.358 0.480 0 1 
inlondon (1/0) 1=lives in inner London 0.022 0.148 0 1 0.014 0.116 0 1 
outlondon (1/0) 1=lives in outer London 0.051 0.220 0 1 0.034 0.181 0 1 
southeast (1/0) 1=lives in SE region 0.173 0.379 0 1 0.137 0.344 0 1 
swea (1/0) 1=lives in SW region or east anglia 0.128 0.334 0 1 0.134 0.341 0 1 
midlands (1/0) 1=lives in Midlands region 0.157 0.364 0 1 0.164 0.370 0 1 
manmersey (1/0) 1=lives in Manchester/Merseyside 0.052 0.223 0 1 0.049 0.216 0 1 
restengland (1/0) 1=lives in other region in England 0.182 0.386 0 1 0.200 0.400 0 1 
wales (1/0) 1=lives in Wales 0.233 0.423 0 1 0.268 0.443 0 1 
managers (1/0) 1: SOC=100-199 0.197 0.398 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 
professionals (1/0) 1: SOC=200-299 0.106 0.308 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 
associates (1/0) 1: SOC=300-399 0.097 0.295 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 
clerical (1/0) 1: SOC=400-499 0.096 0.295 0 1 0.000 0.000 0 0 
craft (1/0) 1: SOC=500-599 0.204 0.403 0 1 0.429 0.495 0 1 
service (1/0) 1: SOC=600-699 0.023 0.151 0 1 0.049 0.217 0 1 
sales (1/0) 1: SOC=700-799 0.043 0.204 0 1 0.042 0.200 0 1 
operatives (1/0) 1: SOC=800-899 0.168 0.374 0 1 0.354 0.478 0 1 
y2001 (1/0) 1: year=2001 0.399 0.490 0 1 0.396 0.489 0 1 
y2002 (1/0) 1: year=2002 0.284 0.451 0 1 0.284 0.451 0 1 
mining (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section C 0.004 0.067 0 1 0.008 0.090 0 1 
manufacturing (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section D 0.308 0.462 0 1 0.400 0.490 0 1 
gaselectric (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section E 0.016 0.124 0 1 0.015 0.123 0 1 
construction (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section F 0.091 0.288 0 1 0.139 0.346 0 1 
wholesale (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section G 0.129 0.335 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 
hotelrest (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section H 0.021 0.142 0 1 0.028 0.164 0 1 
transport (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section I 0.105 0.307 0 1 0.144 0.351 0 1 
finance (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section J 0.020 0.139 0 1 0.001 0.036 0 1 
realestate (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section K 0.117 0.321 0 1 0.051 0.219 0 1 
public (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section L 0.071 0.257 0 1 0.020 0.139 0 1 
education (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section M 0.047 0.211 0 1 0.008 0.087 0 1 
health (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section N 0.034 0.181 0 1 0.023 0.148 0 1 
social (1/0) 1: SIC 92 section O 0.038 0.192 0 1 0.039 0.194 0 1 
maedhi_1 (1/0) 1:mother never went to school 0.010 0.097 0 1 0.006 0.080 0 1 
maedhi_2 (1/0) 1:mo. left school with no quals 0.390 0.488 0 1 0.427 0.495 0 1 
maedhi_3 (1/0) 1:mo. left school with some quals 0.273 0.446 0 1 0.230 0.421 0 1 
maedhi_4 (1/0) 1:mo. got further education quals 0.116 0.320 0 1 0.099 0.299 0 1 
maedhi_5 (1/0) 1:mo. got univ./ higher degree 0.031 0.173 0 1 0.013 0.114 0 1 
motheducmiss (1/0) 1:mother's education missing 0.180 0.384 0 1 0.223 0.416 0 1 
paedhi_1 (1/0) 1:father never went to school 0.008 0.089 0 1 0.006 0.074 0 1 
paedhi_2 (1/0) 1:fa. left school without quals 0.352 0.478 0 1 0.371 0.483 0 1 
paedhi_3 (1/0) 1:fa. left school with some quals 0.169 0.375 0 1 0.162 0.369 0 1 
paedhi_4 (1/0) 1:fa. got further education quals 0.221 0.415 0 1 0.194 0.395 0 1 
paedhi_5 (1/0) 1:fa. got univ./ higher degree 0.051 0.220 0 1 0.020 0.139 0 1 
fatheducmiss (1/0) 1:father's education missing 0.200 0.400 0 1 0.247 0.432 0 1 
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Table 2: Job-related risks by four-digit SIC.  
  Full sample (N=4,940) Blue collar workers (N=2,352) 
  fatal injuries nonfatal inj. fatal injuries nonfatal inj. 
     
Mean (per 100,000) 1.24 161.20 1.79 203.27 
Standard deviation 2.60 157.69 3.07 164.07 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 55.42 1,952.15 55.42 1,952.15 
 
Since we wish to estimate, among other things, fixed-effects models, which rely 
crucially on the variation in risk over time for the same workers, it is useful to assess the 
relative importance of the “within” and “between” variation in risk. When attention is 
restricted to those workers for whom we have repeated observations (1,590 workers in 
the full sample, and 711 workers in the blue-collar sample), we find that the “within” 
variation accounts for about 25% of the total variation in risk for the full sample, and for 
29% for the blue collar sample.  Out of the 1,590 full-sample workers for whom we have 
repeated observations, 717 (about 45%) change jobs (industry) during the three study 
years.  Out of the 711 blue-collar workers for whom we have repeated observations, 320 
(about 45%) change industry during the study period. For both all workers and blue collar 
workers, there is a change in the industry of employment in 17% of the total 
observations.16 
Despite this variability over time, the risks in our sample are small when 
compared with those in Viscusi (2004), who uses worker data from the 1996 Current 
Population Survey in the US and where the average fatality risk over 1992-1997 is 4.02 
in 100,000. Perusal of workplace fatality rates over four decades show that they have 
declined over time in the UK, and that they are at their lowest exactly for the period 
                                                 
16 We are, however, concerned that in some cases this change might be only apparent, perhaps due to a 
better identification of the industry the worker belongs to. For example, when we look at blue-collar 
workers whose SIC code changes over the period covered by our study and at the same time report a tenure 
of zero years (indicating that they are beginning a new job), about 665 appear to be in this situation. 
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covered by this study: As shown in Figure 2, in the UK fatal workplace accident rates per 
100,000 employees fell from about 5.8 in 1959 to 0.7 in 2004. The decline has been quite 
steady, approximately following an exponential decrease rate of 4.75% per annum.17   
 
Figure 2: UK overall fatality rates 1959-2004 (all industries and occupations) 
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Table 2 also reports descriptive statistics about nonfatal injury risk.  Of the two 
rates provided by HSE, we restrict attention to major injuries, defined as those that result 
in an absence of work of three or more days. We do so in hopes of limiting reporting 
incentives and other effects previously noted, among others, by Siebert and Wei (1994).  
Note that the risk of a fatal injury on the job is not significantly different for union vs. 
non-union workers.18   
                                                 
17 Fatality rates declined by 3.1 per 100,000 in the ten years between 1959 and 1969, but the corresponding 
decrease between 1994 and 2004 was only 0.36.  If this process continues at the same rate, only 0.28 lives 
per 100,000 employees will be saved by safety measures imposed between 2004 and 2014.  Further, 
workplace accidents account for a smaller and smaller share of all-cause mortality risks. For males aged 25-
35, for example, the ratio of job mortality risk to the risk of dying for all causes fell from 2.7 % in 1976 to 
0.7 % in 2003, the year of wave 13 of the BHPS.  Similar trends are seen for other age groups as well.  
18 In the full sample, there are 1,540 and 3,400 union and non-union workers, with mean fatality risks of 
1.29 in 100,000 and 1.23 in 100,000, respectively. The standard deviations are 2.98 and 2.41 in 100,000, 
and the t statistic for the difference in means is 0.879, which means that there are no significant differences 
across the two groups.  Among blue collar workers, 842 are unionized and 1,510 non-unionized.  The 
Page 22 of 39
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 22
 
B. Robustness of VSL Estimates to the Inclusion/Exclusion of Variables 
As discussed above, earlier literature has suggested that the compensating wage 
differentials, and hence the estimates of the VSL, are not robust to adding explanatory 
variables—such as industry dummies or non-fatal injury risk—to the right-hand side of 
the wage equation. Are these results common when fitting hedonic wage equations, or are 
they specific to the US data for which they were originally claimed?  
To answer this question, we specify a linear model similar to equation (3), where 
the dependent variable is log annual wages and the independent variables include 
education, experience, experience squared, overtime worked, tenure with the present 
employer, a good health dummy, a race dummy, union status, regional dummies, plus the 
risk variable(s) and, depending on the specification, industry and occupation dummies. 
The model is estimated using OLS. 
The results of this exercise are shown in table 3. They suggest that for the full 
sample the VSL remains relatively stable when industry and occupation dummies are 
added to the regression equations (columns A and B, respectively), but that further 
controlling for non-fatal risk almost doubles the VSL (column C), which then falls by 
about 30% when industry and occupation dummies are further added.19  Although there 
appears to be evidence of significant compensating wage differentials, there are reasons 
to question these results. First, the VSL values are high and well above the values 
considered acceptable by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) ($5-10 million). The second is that 
                                                                                                                                                 
corresponding means (standard deviations) are 1.86 (3.6) and 1.75 (1.7) per 100,000, with a resulting t-
statistic of 0.766.   
19 The VSL is calculated as the product of β2 by average wage, times 100,000 (because risk is expressed as 
XE-05). 
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they change dramatically when non-fatal risks are included in the equation, and the 
coefficient on non-fatal risks is negative, which does not bode well for establishing the 
existence of and measuring compensating wage differentials.  
 
Table 3: OLS coefficient on risk variables for different model specifications 
Risk based on SIC, OLS Fatal risk only Fatal and non-fatal risk 
 A B C D 
 
No industry 
or occupation 
dummies 
With industry 
& occupation 
dummies 
No industry 
or occupation 
dummies 
With industry 
& occupation 
dummies 
All workers (n=4940)     
   Coeff. 0.0072417 0.0054978 0.0137614 0.009623 
   t-stat 3.12 2.23 4.60 3.27 
   Coeff. On nonfatal   -0.0001723 -0.0001272 
   t-stat   -3.44 -2.56 
   VSL (million 1996 £) 14.94 11.34 28.39 19.85 
     
Blue collar workers (n=2352)        
   Coeff. 0.0134518 0.0069669 0.0139539 0.0117124 
   t-stat 5.69 2.71 4.43 3.57 
   Coeff. On nonfatal   -0.0000143 -0.0001421 
   t-stat   -0.24 -2.33 
   VSL (million 1996 £) 22.35 11.58 23.19 19.46 
All regressions control for experience, experience squared, overtime hours worked, tenure, and dummies 
for health status, union membership, race and location. Mean labor income: £20,628 (full sample), £16,616 
(blue collar). The VSL is expressed in million British pounds in 1996 prices; to convert to 2000 dollars, 
multiply by 1.66.  
 
The second panel displays results and implicit VSLs for blue collar workers.  
When we control for fatal and non-fatal risk, the VSL (column C) is similar to that of 
column A, and adding further industry and occupation controls (column D) has a 
relatively modest effect (a 15% reduction) on the VSL.20 However, there is a 50% 
reduction in the VSL when industry and occupation controls are added in the equation 
that uses only fatal risks. Moreover, the VSL figures are, again, high.  Caution should be 
                                                 
20 As Leigh (1995) has shown, apparent wage/risk differentials can be caused by inter-industry wage 
differentials.  In our data, coefficients remained significant even after including industry dummies, which is 
probably due to the fact that risk is measured on the 4-digit SIC level, whereas the industry dummies were 
based on major categories.  
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used when interpreting these results. Viscusi (2003) notes that if most accidents happen 
to blue-collar workers, but fatality rates are computed using all workers in a particular 
industry as the denominator, blue-collar risks will be understated and their VSL 
overstated. Since we are unable to calculate a risk rate specific for blue collar workers 
only, our estimates of the VSL for blue collar workers are potentially affected by this 
problem.  
 
C. Exploiting the Panel Structure of the Data 
Results for the fixed effects (FE) and the random-effects (RE) models are reported 
in the top panel of table 4 for all workers and of table 5 for blue-collar workers. For the 
full sample, the “within” and GLS coefficients on fatal risk are generally positive (with 
one exception), but always small and statistically insignificant. Controlling for non-fatal 
risks strengthens results somewhat, but, as with OLS estimation, non-fatal risks continue 
to be negatively associated with wages.  
Taken together, these results question the very existence of compensating wage 
differentials, or at least our ability to identify them. The estimates of the VSL are 
statistically insignificant in five cases out of eight and significant at the 10% level in two 
cases. Hausman tests reject the null of no correlation between individual-specific effects 
and the included regressors, suggesting that we should not trust the results from GLS 
estimation of the RE model. If we rely on the FE model, however, there is no evidence at 
all of an association between risk and wages. 
For blue collar workers, the “within” coefficients on risks are positive but 
insignificant, whereas their GLS counterparts are positive and significant, and their 
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magnitudes double when non-fatal workplace risks are added in the regression equation. 
As before, Hausman tests reject the null of uncorrelation between individual-specific 
effects and included regressors, implying that the GLS estimates and VSLs are biased.  
 
D. Endogeneity of Risk 
The Hausman tests confirm the notion that individual characteristics that 
influence wages but cannot be observed and get soaked up in the error term of (3) may be 
correlated with workplace risk, making the OLS estimates biased and inconsistent.  To 
circumvent the problem of endogeneity, we instrument for workplace risk and estimate 
equation (3) using 2SLS. Our instruments are all of the right-hand side variables of 
equation (3) plus dummies for the educational attainment of the worker’s mother and 
father, respectively. (We had earlier considered as candidate identifying instruments, and 
subsequently rejected, non-labor income, marriage status and wife income, and 
homeownership status, which were found to have virtually no predictive power for the 
choice of workplace risks and/or failed tests of overidentifying restrictions.)  Note that 
union membership was never a significant predictor of risk.   
The results from 2SLS and the Garen procedure are displayed in the second panel 
of table 4 (for the full sample) and table 5 (for blue-collar workers). For simplicity, we 
restrict attention to the models that include only fatal risk. The coefficients on this 
variable are very similar across the two estimation procedures and robust to adding 
industry and occupation dummies, but negative and significant, which is against the 
notion of compensating wage differentials. In general, we are dissatisfied with 2SLS and 
the Garen procedure: The coefficients on risk for all workers are an order of magnitude 
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larger (in absolute value) than those for blue collar workers, and the (absolute) magnitude 
of the former is implausible.21 
Our next approach allows for fixed effects and endogeneity between risks and 
wages. We first-difference the data to swipe out the fixed effects, and then we instrument 
for  using the lagged exogenous variables (job overtime, health status of the worker, 
location dummy) and risk in the levels lagged twice as our identifying instrument 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The results of the pooled 2SLS on the first differences are reported 
in the bottom panel of table 4 for the full sample and in the bottom panel of table 5 for the 
blue collar workers. In both cases, the coefficient on risk is negative and insignificant at 
the conventional levels. There is no evidence of compensating wage differentials, but the 
econometric procedure is more satisfactory than the earlier ones, in that (i) the tests for 
overidentifying restrictions never reject the null, and (ii) the coefficients on risk are 
similar across the two samples. Similar results—no significant association between risk 
and wages—are obtained if we use  or  in lieu of , and if we use  and 
 as identifying instruments. The sign of the estimated α in equation (4) sometimes 
changes as we replace one lagged risk with another, but the estimated coefficients are 
always completely insignificant (results available from the authors upon request).  
itpΔ
3
1−tP 3−tP 2−tP 2−tP
−tP
  
                                                 
21 One possible explanation for this is that only roughly 3-5% of the variation in job risk for all workers can 
be predicted using the instruments, with the remainder being absorbed into the residuals ߝଶ̂௜  As a 
consequence, the residuals are highly correlated with job risk  and with ߝଶ̂௜݌௜ in equation (9). The 
correlation coefficient between ߝଶ̂௜ and ݌௜ is 0.98 for all workers and also for blue-collar workers, which 
explains why the regression coefficient β2 is so sensitive to the inclusion of the residuals.  Arabsheibani and 
Marin (2001) report that they encountered the very same problem, despite using a broader set of 
instruments and obtaining much better first-stage R squares, and conclude that compensating risk 
differentials extracted in this way should be viewed with great caution due to multicollinearity. 
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Table 4: Compensating wage regression results for the full sample 
Risk based on SIC, all workers Fatal risk only Fatal and nonfatal risk 
  
No industry or 
occupation 
dummies 
With industry & 
occupation 
dummies 
No industry or 
occupation 
dummies 
With industry & 
occupation 
dummies 
FE (n=4072)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0007503 0.0002574 0.0008379 0.0018583 
   t-stat -0.37 0.12 0.34 0.74 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   -0.0000479 -0.0000544 
   t-stat   -1.18 -1.27 
   VSL n/a 0.53 1.73 3.83 
RE (n=4072)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates 0.0012881 0.0024189 0.0039372 0.0047166 
   z-stat 0.68 1.15 1.71 1.93 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   -0.0000772 -0.0000757 
   z-stat   -2.02 -1.82 
   Hausman test statistic 265 1267 273 1298 
      Chisq degrees of freedom 12 31 14 33 
      p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
   VSL 2.66 4.99 8.12 9.73 
2SLS (n=4940)         
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.1949241 -0.1581687   
   t-stat -4.27 -2.48   
   VSL n/a n/a   
   Test for overidentifying instr. 20.25 22.23   
      Chisq degrees of freedom 26 46   
      p-value 0.7796 0.9988   
Garen proc. (n=4940)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.193525 -0.15676   
   t-stat -6.79 -3.39   
   VSL n/a n/a   
First differences 2SLS (n=2197)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0038741 -0.0046378 -0.0102986 -0.0082599 
   t-stat -0.81 -0.85 -1.03 -0.85 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   0.0001229 0.0000919 
   t-stat   0.79 0.59 
   VSL n/a n/a n/a n/a 
   Test for overidentifying instr. 15.38 15.38 14.94 40.21 
      Chisq degrees of freedom 24 43 24 43 
      p-value 0.9091 >0.9999 0.9225 0.5930 
Hausman-Taylor (n=4072)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0006194 0.0004424 0.0010411 0.0020218 
   z-stat -0.34 0.22 0.47 0.88 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   -0.0000501 -0.0000537 
   t-stat   -1.36 -1.36 
   VSL n/a 0.91 2.15 4.17 
All regressions control for experience, experience squared, overtime hours worked, tenure, and dummies 
for health status, union membership, race and location. Mean labor income: £20,628 (full sample), £16,616 
(blue collar). The VSL is expressed in million British pounds in 1996 prices; to convert to 2000 dollars, 
multiply by 1.66.   
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Table 5: Compensating wage regression results for blue-collar workers 
Risk based on SIC, blue collar Fatal risk only Fatal and nonfatal risk 
workers only No industry or 
occupation 
dummies 
With industry & 
occupation 
dummies 
No industry or 
occupation 
dummies 
With industry & 
occupation 
dummies 
FE (n=1796)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates 0.0008267 0.0020324 0.004904 0.0049259 
   t-stat 0.33 0.79 1.55 1.52 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   -0.0001227 -0.0000934 
   t-stat   -2.05 -1.49 
   VSL 1.37 3.38 8.15 8.18 
RE (n=1796)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates 0.0047789 0.0048204 0.0081148 0.0093041 
   z-stat 2.14 2.03 2.82 3.13 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   -0.0000992 -0.0001422 
   z-stat   -1.84 -2.51 
   Hausman test statistic 114 223 118 247 
      Chisq degrees of freedom 11 25 12 26 
      p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
   VSL 7.94 8.01 13.48 15.46 
2SLS (n=2352)         
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0331052 -0.0920726   
   t-stat -1.12 -1.68   
   VSL n/a n/a   
   Test for overidentifying instr. 38.57 23.99   
      Chisq degrees of freedom 26 42   
      p-value 0.0536 0.9885   
Garen proc. (n=2353)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0307729 -0.0913419   
   t-stat -1.12 -2.13   
   VSL n/a n/a   
First differences 2SLS (n=970)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates -0.0043936 -0.0053483 -0.0158598 -0.0226084 
   t-stat -0.53 -0.55 -0.50 -0.73 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   0.0001824 0.0002946 
   t-stat   0.42 0.69 
   VSL n/a n/a n/a n/a 
   Test for overidentifying instr. 14.16 11.74 13.58 10.96 
      Chisq degrees of freedom 22 35 22 35 
      p-value 0.8957 0.9999 0.9157 >0.9999 
Hausman-Taylor (n=1796)     
   Coeff. on mortality rates 0.0007297 0.0020311 0.0047708 0.0049165 
   z-stat 0.24 0.82 1.21 1.12 
   Coeff. on nonfatal injury rates   -0.0001216 -0.0000917 
   t-stat   -1.63 -1.07 
   VSL 1.21 3.37 7.93 8.17 
All regressions control for experience, experience squared, overtime hours worked, tenure, and dummies 
for health status, union membership, race and location. Mean labor income: £20,628 (full sample), £16,616 
(blue collar). The VSL is expressed in million British pounds in 1996 prices; to convert to 2000 dollars, 
multiply by 1.66.  
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One limitation of the above approach is that we would like to allow other 
regressors to be endogenous with wage, and are concerned about good instruments and 
the efficiency of the estimates. To circumvent these problems, we implement the 
Hausman-Taylor procedure, treating education as an endogenous time-invariant 
regressor, and experience, experience squared, tenure, union status, and occupation and 
industry dummies as endogenous time-varying regressors. Race, good health, 
geographical dummies, and job overtime are regarded as exogenous variables.  
The results show that whether or not one controls for non-fatal risk, the 
coefficients on fatal risk are positive, but statistically insignificant for the both the full 
sample and the subset of blue-collar workers. (Only in one specification, that of column 
(A) for the full sample, do we get a negative coefficient on risk.) The estimates of the 
VSL are insignificant, but within reasonable ranges—£3-8 million for all workers and 
£1.21-8.17 for blue collar workers.   
 
V. Conclusions  
Much of the earlier literature on compensating wages and VSL is based on cross-
sections of workers and on the assumption that workplace risks are exogenous, raising the 
question whether the VSL figures they obtain are biased. Unlike previous studies, we use 
panel data documenting wages and other individual characteristics of UK workers to 
examine whether the evidence of compensating wage differentials for workplace risk and 
to recover estimates of the VSL implicit in workers’ job choices.  We have risk data at 
the four-digit industry level.  
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With this particular dataset, any evidence of compensating wage differential is at 
best inconclusive. We get large VSL figures only under the strongest possible 
assumptions, i.e., when unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous regressors are ruled 
out. Even so, the VSLs are suspiciously large and often very sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of certain key regressors.  Another problematic result is that when we 
include non-fatal workplace risks in the regression, its coefficient is negative (and often 
significant).  We attribute the latter result to the correlation between fatality rates and the 
risk of non-fatal injuries (Miller, 2000, Dillingham et al., 1996), pervasive measurement 
errors in non-fatal injury rates (Kniesner and Black, 2003), and reporting problems with 
non-fatal injuries (Siebert and Wei, 1994).   
As soon as we allow for unobserved heterogeneity and use an estimation 
technique that does not rely on the assumption of uncorrelation between unobserved 
effects and included regressors, the evidence of risk premiums disappears. We reach the 
same conclusion when we further allow for endogenous risks and right-hand side 
variables, in addition to unobserved effects. In many cases, the coefficient on fatal risks is 
negative and insignificant, providing no empirical support for the existence of 
compensating wage differentials. 
In general, one would expect the OLS estimates of the coefficient on risks to be 
downward biased if risks are endogenous or mismeasured, assuming that the 
measurement error is classical (i.e., there is no correlation between it and the included 
regressors or the dependent variable). Remedying these problems through appropriate 
estimation techniques would thus be expected to produce larger coefficients on risks, and 
hence larger VSLs. Siebert and Wei (1994) show that if workers with greater unmeasured 
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ability obtain better pay and choose safer jobs than less skilful workers, pay may appear 
to be negatively correlated with risks, even though more skilful workers actually receive 
large compensating wage differentials for a given level of risk.  On the assumption that 
union workers are likely to have greater unobserved ability, Siebert and Wei estimate 
switching regression equations where union membership is endogenous and workplace 
risks are also treated as endogenous, and find that union workers have higher 
compensating wage differentials. Pooled-sample OLS estimation would incorrectly lead 
one to the opposite conclusion.   
In our case, when we instrument for risks and try to purge out the measurement 
error, we see any evidence of compensating wage differentials vanish. Our results are 
thus in contrast with the standard attenuation bias story and with the hypothesis that more 
skilful workers will select better pay and lower risks. They are, however, consistent with 
the possibility that risk measurement errors might be correlated with other included 
regressors, in which case it is difficult to sign the bias of the OLS estimates (Kniesner 
and Black, 2003; Black et al., 2003). This would happen if, for example, within a certain 
industry assignment to riskier shifts is correlated with worker characteristics such as age, 
gender, and ethnicity.22 They are also consistent with the possibility formally analyzed by 
Shogren and Stamland (2002) that workers might be heterogeneous in preferences (for 
risks and income) and skills, in which case higher-risk jobs are chosen by individuals 
                                                 
22 Kniesner and Black illustrate this case for the fast-food industry. If younger and female clerks are 
assigned to daytime shifts, while older males do nighttime shifts, when the likelihood of robberies is higher, 
then the risks of younger and female clerks are overstated and those of older males are understated. Clearly, 
the measurement error is correlated with age and gender.  
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who are more risk-tolerant or (feel that they) have skills to avoid fatal accidents on the 
job. Shogren and Stamland show that this would overstate the VSL.23  
It is also possible that compensating wage differentials these days are detectable 
only when attention is restricted to specific occupations, industries, or firm sizes, and that 
our approach has simply been unable to pick them up.  It is natural to think about the 
contrast between union and non-union workers, but we do not believe our data warrant 
the model deployed by Siebert and Wei. In our sample, pay is higher among union 
members when we lo k at the full sample, but when we restrict attention to blue collar 
workers the association between pay and union status (controlling for other worker 
characteristics) is weaker. Moreover, we find that risks tend to be roughly the same 
among union and non-union individuals.  
In sum, our results raise doubts about the existence of compensating wage 
differentials for job risk and/or the analyst’s ability to detect them using recent labor 
market data, despite the availability of longitudinal data and the opportunity to control for 
unobserved worker characteristics. Caution should, of course, be used when interpreting 
these results.  For starters, workplace risks in our dataset are low during our study 
period—indeed, at a historical low for the UK—which may have impaired our ability to 
detect compensating wage differentials (or to rule out with confidence their existence). 
Mrozek and Taylor’s meta-analysis (2002) finds that the estimated VSLs tend to be 
quadratic in risks, with the lowest VSLs being found in the studies with the lowest and 
highest risk levels. The average risks in our sample are well below those in the studies 
                                                 
23 This would happen because we infer the compensating wage differential from a marginal worker—a low-
skill, high-risk worker—who is the one that demands the most compensation for workplace risks. But this 
maximum compensating differential is divided by the average risks to get the VSL, resulting in an 
overestimate of the latter.  
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covered by Mrozek and Taylor, even when attention is restricted to blue collar workers, 
placing us in the range where small or no compensating wage differentials are observed.    
Second, workplace fatality risk has been declining sharply over the period 1959-
2004.  This reflects changes that may be legally and technologically driven, making the 
notion of stable compensating wage differentials that result from negotiation between the 
worker and the employer very suspect. This does not, of course, mean that people do not 
value safety, and indeed Costa and Kahn (2004) have documented that in the US over the 
last few decades, workplace risks have declined and the VSL has risen, which means that 
individuals have placed an increasingly large value on safety. 
Third, we took great pains to look for good instruments for workplace risks, but 
future studies might be designed to exploit exogenous changes in workplace regulations, 
which might serve as instruments for workplace risks. Since we have not been able to 
track the recent dynamics of such shifts, we conclude that if compensating differentials 
for risk exist, a host of econometric problems as well as a changing workplace risk 
environment prevent us from observing them.  
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